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Enhancing “Education”: Rebalancing the 
Relationship Between Athletics and the University 
William W. Berry III* 
This symposium Article argues for a rebalancing of the relationship 
between athletics and the university. Specifically, it challenges college 
presidents to leverage the economic growth of intercollegiate athletics to 
enhance the academic side of the university for all students. The university 
ought to utilize athletics to improve the institution, not sacrifice its core 
mission to serve the athletics department. To be clear, this rebalancing 
would be consistent with the core ideals that both the university presidents 
and the NCAA have been verbalizing for decades.  
In Part I, the Article describes the shift from a symbiotic relationship 
to a more parasitic relationship, with athletics exerting dominance over the 
university at many institutions. Part II argues for a rebalancing—outlining 
a relational shift consistent with the values of the NCAA and the practices 
at some institutions. Finally, Part III addresses the practical obstacles to 
such a shift and provides a road map for universities to enhance the 
student-athlete educational model that the NCAA champions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I will turn your face to alabaster / Then you’ll find your servant is 
your master.”1 —Sting 
 
By many standards, the economic success of intercollegiate athletics 
has reached a pinnacle.2 The college football playoff yields payouts to 
universities in excess of $600 million per year,3 and the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) enjoys roughly $900 million 
in revenue from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament each March.4 For 
universities in conferences with their own television networks, contracts 
can yield tens of millions of dollars a year for universities.5 
And yet, most athletics departments lose money annually.6 At many 
universities, the revenue sports of football and basketball—occasionally 
baseball and women’s basketball as well7—subsidize all of the other sports 
                                                                                                             
 1. THE POLICE, Wrapped Around Your Finger, on SYNCHRONICITY (A&M 
Records 1983). 
 2. Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in the Red, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-the-
bills/ (“Big-time college sports departments are making more money than ever 
before.”) [https://perma.cc/SF5B-BHV5]. 
 3. Kristi Dosh, College Football Playoff Payouts By Conference For 2016-
17, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2016/12 
/31/college-football-playoff-payouts-by-conference-for-2016-17/#7229e24e5da5 
[https://perma.cc/R84R-GYHC]. 
 4. Jonathan Berr, March Madness: Follow the Money, CBS NEWS (Mar. 20, 
2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/march-madness-follow-the-money/ [https:// 
perma.cc/W769-LVSB]. 
 5. See, e.g., Kristi Dosh, A Comparison: Conference Television Deals, ESPN 
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.espn.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/3163/a-
comparison-conference-televisiondeals [https://perma.cc/9KS6-C275]. 
 6. Steve Berkowitz, Jodi Upton & Erik Brady, Most NCAA Division I athletic 
departments take subsidies, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013), http://www.usatoday 
.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-subsidies/2142443/ [https://per 
ma.cc/AL6M-G5S6]; Shane Shifflett & Ben Hallman, The Subsidy Gap, HUFF. POST 
(Nov. 25, 2015, 9:50 AM), http://projects.huffingtonpost.com/projects/ncaa/subsidy-
gap [https://perma.cc/8WLN-2V7L]. 
 7. Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances 2015-2016, USA TODAY, 
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances/ (last visited July 27, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/H36H-2MUL]; Brad Wolverton et al., The 10-Billion Sports Tab, 
THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.chronicle.com 
/interactives/ncaa-subsidies-main#id=table_2014 [https://perma.cc/S94X-SLLW]; 
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at the university, including coaches’ salaries, recruiting costs, scholarships, 
facilities, uniforms, and travel costs.8 Even worse, many athletics 
departments use student fees to subsidize their athletics programs, particularly 
the football programs.9 In non-Power Five conference programs, student 
tuition and fees usually account for half, if not more, of the athletics 
department’s budget.10 
The financial crisis in athletics departments, however, is a more recent 
development11 that ironically has corresponded with the ballooning 
revenues generated by postseason games and television contracts.12 The 
two primary culprits for the increased athletics department costs lurk in 
the wild increase in coaches’ salaries in revenue sports, including assistant 
coaches,13 and the facility arms race14 among athletics programs—used 
                                                                                                             
Kristi Dosh, Does Football Fund Other Sports At College Level?, FORBES (May 5, 
2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/05/05/does-football-fund-
other-sports-at-college-level/#7a9c82a0563e [https://perma.cc/6UH6-PECJ]. 
 8. Paula Lavigne, College Sports Thrive Amid Downturn, ESPN (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10851446/sports-programs-nation-top-public-
colleges-thrived-economic-downturn-earning-record-revenues [https://perma.cc/X6E3- 
5GVT]. 
 9. Berkowitz et al., supra note 7; Wolverton et al., supra note 7; see also 
William W. Berry III, Educating Athletes, 81 TENN. L. REV. 795, 798–99 (2014) 
(citation omitted). 
 10. Berkowitz et al., supra note 7; Wolverton et al., supra note 7. The Power 
Five conferences are the SEC, Big 10, ACC, Big 12, and Pac-12. Shifflett & 
Hallman, supra note 6. For instance, Morehead State University subsidized 86% 
of its athletics department budget in 2014, with student fees and tuition covering 
$9.3 million of a $10.8 million budget. Wolverton et al., supra note 7. 
 11. Hobson & Rich, supra note 2; Brian Burnsed, Athletics Departments That 
Make More Than They Spend Still a Minority, NCAA (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www 
.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/athletics-departments-make-more-they 
-spend-still-minority [https://perma.cc/698X-YWAW]. 
 12. Hobson & Rich, supra note 2 (“Big-time college sports departments are 
making more money than ever before, thanks to skyrocketing television contracts, 
endorsement and licensing deals, and big-spending donors.”). 
 13. Andrew Zimbalist, College Coaches’ Salaries and Higher Education, 
HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-zimbalist/college-coaches-
salaries-_1_b_6400256.html (last updated Mar. 2, 2015) (noting that between 
2005 and 2012, the average salary of head football coaches at the top 25 football 
schools increased over 60%) [https://perma.cc/9365-SPFS].  
 14. With the increase in television money, universities consistently have 
sought to improve their facilities in recent years and make them better than peer 
institutions, leading to an “arms race” of sorts. The University of Oregon is one 
obvious example of the facility arms race. See Peter Berkes, Incredible Photos 
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both as a recruiting tool and an additional source of revenue.15 Despite 
these developments, the financial situation is not desperate for schools in 
the Power Five conferences,16 as economic revenues continue to grow with 
few signs of over-saturation in the marketplace, at least for a few years.17 
The increased commercialization in college sports, however, continues to 
fuel the ongoing debate concerning whether athletes in revenue sports should 
receive compensation, otherwise known as pay-for-play.18 In addition to 
pointing out the current budgetary limits of many schools, opponents of pay-
for-play (“traditionalists”) often argue that the university provides the 
platform for the product.19 In other words, traditionalists posit that fans 
typically attend sporting events because of their loyalty and admiration for the 
institution, rather than to watch a particular athlete.20 The traditionalists 
similarly argue that the unique product of intercollegiate athletics has value 
                                                                                                             
and Video of Oregon’s New Football Facility, SBNATION (July 31, 2013), 
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/7/31/4574556/oregon-football- 
building-new. [https://perma.cc/NBE7-6LXV]. 
 15. Sam Brody, Meet the Big-Money Boosters Behind College Football’s Top 25 
Teams, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 5, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.motherjones.com 
/media/2014/09/college-football-boosters-top-25 [https://perma.cc/7ZZC-H3LP]. 
 16. See Shifflett & Hallman, supra note 6. 
 17. Paula Lavigne, Rich Get Richer in College Sports As Poorer Schools Struggle 
to Keep Up, ESPN (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/17 
447429/power-5-conference-schools-made-6-billion-last-year-gap-haves-nots-grows 
(“The nation’s richest athletic departments—those in the Power Five conferences—
pulled in a record $6 billion last year, nearly $4 billion more than all other schools 
combined . . . . The gulf between college sports’ haves and have-nots has never been 
greater.”) [https://perma.cc/FQB9-8CCR]. 
 18. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-
paying-college-athletes.html [https://perma.cc/39EJ-EVAW]; Taylor Branch, The 
Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com 
/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ [https://perma.cc 
/9XN2-HRUS]. 
 19. See, e.g., Scoop Jackson, Pay for play isn’t answer for college athletics, 
ESPN (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/9666004 
/pay-play-answer-college-athletics [https://perma.cc/F72T-CVZ5]. 
 20. See, e.g., Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, Why the Arguments Against 
NCAA Pay-For-Play Suck, DEADSPIN (Dec. 12, 2013), https://deadspin.com/why-
the-arguments-against-ncaa-pay-for-play-suck-1481854847 (“Some have argued 
that in fact the athletes really are not worth very much. The argument goes that 
college sports fans are very loyal and will spend money regardless of who is on 
the field—that is, they root for uniforms.”) [https://perma.cc/Z837-D43G].  
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because the athletes are students at the university—and amateurs—
distinguishing the enterprise entirely from professional sports leagues.21  
Pursuing this line of argument further, one can infer that the universities 
provide the platform and deserve the credit for the financial success of the 
entire enterprise of intercollegiate athletics. If this inference is true, it begs 
the question of what benefits the university accrues from having an athletics 
program.22 Put another way, the question is whether the university-athletics 
relationship is symbiotic—benefitting both mutually—or parasitic—with 
one thriving by taking advantage of the other.23 
Traditionally, the assumption has been that the relationship remains a 
symbiotic one, both on an institutional and individual level.24 This notion 
certainly remains at the center of the NCAA’s stated vision of intercollegiate 
athletics.25 Indeed, the NCAA characterizes athletics as a form of education, 
as one part of the institution’s ultimate goal of providing quality higher 
education to its students.26 The NCAA Manual explains: 
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and 
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-
athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises.27 
                                                                                                             
 21. See Ekow N. Yankah, Why N.C.A.A. Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/why-
ncaa-athletes-shouldnt-be-paid [https://perma.cc/UVH2-SMYQ]. 
 22. See, e.g., KRISTI DOSH, SATURDAY MILLIONAIRES: HOW WINNING 
FOOTBALL BUILDS WINNING COLLEGES (2013); Devin G. Pope & Jaren C. Pope, 
The Impact of College Sports Success on the Quantity and Quality of Student 
Applications, 75 SOUTH. ECON. J. 750, 776 (2009).  
 23. Sudhakaran Prabakaran, To Be Parasitic or Symbiotic?, SCIENCE 
SIGNALING (Dec. 15, 2015), http://stke.sciencemag.org/content/8/407/ec371 
[https://perma.cc/N5UW-MQSP]. 
 24. See Jason Keene, Who’s Really Winning? An In-Depth Look at 
Intercollegiate Athletics and Their Impact on Undergraduate Education 5 (Social 
Impact Research Experience, Working Paper No. 5, 2011) (“[A] symbiotic 
relationship exists between athletics and academics.”). 
 25. NCAA Core Values emphasize the role of “[t]he collegiate model of 
athletics” in “balancing [students’] academic, social and athletics experiences.” 
NCAA Core Values, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://ncaa.org/about 
/ncaa-core-values (last visited July 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9D4F-QE7S]. 
 26. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N ACADEMIC AND MEMBERSHIP 
AFFAIRS STAFF, NCAA 2016-2017 DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2.9 (2016). 
 27. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Commercialized college athletics certainly add significant value to the 
university in terms of advertising, promotion, and goodwill.28 One metaphor 
for this relationship describes the athletics department as the “front porch” 
of the institution—the method by which the university attracts visitors, 
students, and the community at large while also providing a point for alumni 
and donors to connect with the institution.29 Indeed, athletics success often 
translates to improvements in the quantity and quality of the student 
body.30 
Even so, the pendulum has shifted toward a commercialized version 
of athletics that increasingly depends upon the university for its economic 
support.31 As Laura Pappano explained, “Since [the 1960s], athletic 
departments have kicked the roof off their budgets, looking more like 
independent franchises than university departments. It is that point—‘this 
                                                                                                             
 28. Robert J. Sternberg, College Athletics: Necessary, Not Just Nice to Have, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. AND UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, http://www.nacubo.org 
/Business_Officer_Magazine/Business_Officer_Plus/Bonus_Material/College_ 
Athletics_Necessary_Not_Just_Nice_to_Have.html (last visited July 9, 2017) 
(reporting that an administrator at a Division I school cites branding benefits as one 
reason “that college athletics provide great value on the field and off”) [https://per 
ma.cc/E7B3-HRVS].  
 29. Jeré Longman, As Costs of Sports Rise, Students Balk at Fees, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A1 (quoting Utah State Athletics Director Scott Barnes, 
who said, “[college] athletics are the front porch of the university. It’s not the most 
important room in the house, but it is the most visible.”); see also Jason Belzer, 
The Priorities of University Presidents: Where Do College Athletics Fit In?, 
FORBES (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2015/11/23 
/the-priorities-of-university-presidents-where-do-college-athletics-fit-in/#623f322a 
5ab3 [https://perma.cc/CS3T-24DU]. 
 30. See, e.g., DOSH, supra note 22. Duke and TCU provide examples of this 
phenomenon. See Joe Drape, Alabama is Rolling in Cash with Tide Lifting All Boats, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/sports/ncaa 
football/alabama-crimson-tide-football-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/Q9N8-D 
TUM]; see also Robert Taylor Baker, Does College Football Success Impact 
Academic Rankings and the Overall Academic Quality of Incoming Students for 
Private Universities? (May 2, 2014) (unpublished thesis, Texas Christian 
University), https://repository.tcu.edu/bitstream/handle/116099117/7348/Thesis 
_FINAL_Copy_Taylor_Baker_May_5.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/CT7H-
JZZB]. 
 31. Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Why Students Foot the Bill for College Sports, 
and How Some Are Fighting Back, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/sports/why-students-foot-the-bill-for-college-sports-and-how-some-
are-fighting-back/2015/11/30/7ca47476-8d3e-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html  
[https://perma.cc/65QA-2AB2].  
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commercial thing’ in the middle of academia . . . that some believe has 
thrown the system out of kilter.”32  
At many schools, 50% or more of the monies used in the athletics 
budget consists of tuition dollars.33 In most cases, universities help to fund 
the athletics department despite a significant percentage of donors electing 
to give to athletics instead of academics.34 
With coaches’ salaries escalating at a rate far beyond those of 
administrators and faculty and improvements to athletics facilities often 
prioritized over improvements to academic buildings, one wonders whether 
the balance between education and athletics has shifted too far in favor of 
athletics.35 The NCAA’s purported emphasis on amateurism and education 
underscores this point, as the commercialization of sports appears to 
compromise these aims.36  
The current status quo of intercollegiate athletics, however, contains a 
number of impediments to change. Antitrust law prohibits any systemic 
restrictions on coaches’ salaries or facility improvements.37 The pressure 
to win games and participate in postseason contests likewise drives up the 
costs of recruiting, the need for facility improvements, and the willingness 
to absorb multi-million dollar buyouts for coaches who win—but not 
enough.38 Despite increasing saturation of college sports, economic 
                                                                                                             
 32. Laura Pappano, How Big-Time Sports Ate College Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2012, at ED22.  
 33. See Shifflett & Hallman, supra note 6.  
 34. See Allie Grasgreen, Winning Boosts (Athletic) Giving, INSIDE HIGHER 
EDUC. (Apr. 27, 2012) http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/04/27/athletic-
giving-crowds-out-academic-donations-research-finds (reporting data on the 
relationship between athletics donations, academic donations, and success of 
university athletics) [https://perma.cc/M6D7-UXRZ]. 
 35. See, e.g., Zimbalist, supra note 13 (showing the large increase in coach 
remuneration); Patrick Rishe, College Football Coaching Salaries Grows 
Astronomically Due to Escalating Media Rights Deals, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2012, 6:40 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2012/11/20/college-football-coaching-
salaries-grow-astronomically-due-to-escalating-media-rights-deals/#2e5adc735e56 
(questioning the wisdom of the growth of salaries) [https://perma.cc/LN9B-PXPG].  
 36. See NCAA 2016-2017 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 26. 
 37. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 
1998) (holding that NCAA restrictions on restricted earnings basketball coaches 
violated the Sherman Act). 
 38. See, e.g., Nick Martin, College Football Coaches are Getting Insane 
Buyout Clauses, DEADSPIN (Oct. 26, 2016, 3:05 PM), http://deadspin.com/college 
football-coaches-are-getting-insane-buyout-clau-1788246837 [https://perma.cc 
/N25N-XC6Y]; Brent Schrotenboer, Steve Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, 
Hiring a College Football Coach is Expensive. Firing One is, Too., USA TODAY 
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growth continues as cable and satellite television depend increasingly on 
live events for its survival in a world of Netflix, Amazon, Apple TV, and 
other providers of streaming content.39  
This Article argues for a rebalancing of the relationship between 
athletics and the university. Specifically, it challenges college presidents to 
exploit the student-athlete concept to improve the academic side of the 
university for all students. The university should be utilizing athletics to 
improve the institution, not sacrificing its core mission to serve the athletics 
department. This rebalancing would be consistent with the core ideals that 
both the presidents and the NCAA have been verbalizing for decades.  
In Part I, the Article describes the shift from a symbiotic relationship to 
a more parasitic relationship in recent years, with athletics exerting 
dominance over the university at many institutions. Part II argues for a 
rebalancing—outlining a relational shift consistent with the values of the 
NCAA. Finally, Part III addresses the practical obstacles to such a shift 
and provides a road map for universities to enhance the “education” model 
that the NCAA champions. 
I. ATHLETICS DOMINANCE OF UNIVERSITIES 
Historically, athletics were an extra-curricular activity undertaken as 
an avocation while students pursued a university degree.40 Over time, 
public interest in intercollegiate sports competitions have grown, 
                                                                                                             
(Oct. 27, 2016, 9:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2016/10 
/26/college-football-coach-salary-database-buyouts-kirk-ferentz-iowa-charlie- 
strong-texas/92417648/ [https://perma.cc/U3FU-VHRF]; Stephanie Riegel, 
Buyout of Les Miles’ Contract to Cost $9M-Plus Over Six Years, GREATER BATON 
ROUGE BUS. REP. (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.businessreport.com/article 
/buyout-les-miles-contract-cost-9m-plus-six-years (reporting a recent example of 
this phenomenon concerning Les Miles, who had a $12.9 million buyout and a 
70% winning percentage) [https://perma.cc/U9Y8-WKR5]. 
 39. Jeff Clement, How Live Sports are Saving Cable TV (and Why Advertisers 
Should Care), DIRECT RESPONSE ADVERT. NEWS & BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015, 4:26 
PM), https://www.marketingarchitects.com/blog/how-live-sports-are-saving-cable-
networks-and-why-advertisers-should-care [https://perma.cc/3YJX-KKX2]; Derek 
Thompson, Sports Could Save the TV Business—or Destroy It, ATLANTIC (July 17, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/07/sports-could-save-
the-tv-business-or-destroy-it/277808/ [https://perma.cc/3LTM-E3MU]. 
 40. D. Siegel, The Union of Athletics With Educational Institutions, CLARK 
SCIENCE CTR., http://www.science.smith.edu/exersci/ESS200/Ed/Athletic.htm (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2017) (stating that college athletics were “philosophically thought to 
be a peripheral and extracurricular activity”) [https://perma.cc/64KQ-7S74]. 
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particularly for football and men’s basketball competitions.41 In the past 
four decades, though, athletics grew exponentially.42 Even as college 
sports have approached or, in some cases, exceeded the commercial nature 
of professional sports, the NCAA has held firm to its vision of amateurism.43 
To be fair, college athletes garner an increased amount of revenue, including 
broader meal benefits for athletes and cost of attendance, but these economic 
benefits apparently do not compromise the amateurism ideal that the NCAA 
espouses because they are “education-related.”44 
A. The Platform of “Education” 
The NCAA concept of student-athlete casts college sports simply as 
part of higher education.45 The NCAA’s purpose is not to pursue 
institutional financial remuneration but instead to provide an opportunity 
to “play the game” as part of a student-athlete’s education.46 Protecting the 
amateur character of the student-athlete thus shields the university from 
                                                                                                             
 41. See generally RONALD SMITH, SPORTS AND FREEDOM: THE RISE OF BIG-
TIME COLLEGE ATHLETICS (1988); John Henderson, College Game Has Never Been 
More Popular, DENVER POST (Sept. 3, 2007, 4:27 PM), http://www.denverpost.com 
/2007/09/03/college-game-has-never-been-more-popular/ [https://perma.cc/ 7D9M-
HQ2G]. 
 42. See Pappano, supra note 32. 
 43. Ben Cohen, Big-Time College Athletes Ask, ‘Who’s the Amateur?’, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203554 
104577003912924175878 [https://perma.cc/79RE-MFVU]. 
 44. See Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 2014–2015 N.L.R.B. Dec. 
¶ (CCH) 15781, at *1 (Mar. 26, 2014), dismissed on other grounds, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 167 (2015); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 45. See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender 
of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329 (2007); Matthew J. 
Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College 
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education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes 
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diminishing its core mission: education.47 The NCAA’s rhetoric 
concerning “education” makes this clear.  
From the perspective of the NCAA, this “education” provided by 
intercollegiate sports should not serve as a platform to prepare athletes for 
a professional sports career; rather, the “education” involved in the 
student-athlete experience trains the student-athlete to “go pro in 
something else.”48 As such, the entire justification for the concept of 
amateurism that the NCAA so aggressively protects rests in “education.”49 
Allowing pay-for-play would compromise this pursuit of “education” because 
the purpose of participating in athletics would shift from educational 
development to economic gain through participation in intercollegiate 
athletics.50  
Indeed, the NCAA and its member institutions view any introduction of 
remuneration as a step down a slippery slope toward commercialization of 
student-athlete participation.51 To allow any compensation above what an 
individual needs to achieve educational success would be akin to adding 
poison to the current status quo—even a small amount would create 
disastrous outcomes.52 
B. Athletics as the Front Porch of the University 
Before exploring why the current model has lost its efficacy, at least as 
currently constituted, it is important to highlight the virtues of robust athletics 
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programs on university campuses. As the “front porch” of the institution, a 
successful athletics program invites many outside stakeholders—alumni, 
corporate sponsors, fans—into the university to celebrate its successes and 
suffer through its defeats.53 The idea of being part of a larger sports 
community, the “nation,” gives individuals and institutions a connection to 
the university and a passion for the university that would be hard to 
manufacture in other ways, particularly on the scale it achieves. Indeed, it 
is difficult to imagine 100,000 people regularly coming on campus to 
celebrate or engage in an academic conference or other non-athletics event.  
And athletics success attracts to campuses strong students who want to 
join the community surrounding the athletics program.54 The widespread 
exposure of football and basketball also serves as an ongoing commercial 
for the participating institutions.55 When the athletics teams of a university 
succeed, the university often enjoys direct benefits by attracting stronger 
students, increasing enrollment, and receiving increased donations to 
academic departments—not just the athletics department.56 The benefits 
also often extend to the university town, spurring economic growth directly 
attributable to athletics.57  
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These benefits are not hypothetical—they are tangible and real. 
Particularly for large, public state universities, the athletics programs 
provide a consistent boost to the strength of the university.58 With state 
appropriations comprising a smaller and smaller percentage of university 
revenue, public universities increasingly rely on tuition income and alumni 
giving to fund their operations; athletics success aids both of these revenue 
streams.59 The enrollment at large, public state universities has exploded 
over the past decade, and the culture of intercollegiate athletics and the 
university brand it creates attracts students on a national scope.60 Likewise, 
capital campaigns continue to grow at many universities despite the effects 
of the Great Recession on donor capacity.61 
C. The Costs of the Explosion of Athletics 
Despite the proliferation of benefits for the university resulting from 
athletics, a series of costs—economic and social—have arisen from the 
commercialization of intercollegiate sports. Given the increase in revenue 
from intercollegiate athletics, one might expect that athletics would, in some 
way, help with the subsidization of academic programs at the university. 
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Although athletics departments have subsidized academic programs in a few 
cases, more often universities help subsidize the athletics programs.62  
At many universities, for instance, student fees help subsidize the 
institution’s football program.63 On one level, this practice may be 
defensible, particularly given the benefits that athletics can bring the 
university. In light of the NCAA’s rhetoric about education being the central 
purpose of amateurism, though, it seems less justified, particularly when 
such contributions constitute 50% or more of the athletics budget.64 
Pushing deeper, the increase in athletics spending—and consequential 
budgetary shortfall for many schools—relates directly to expenditures 
related to coaching and recruiting in revenue sports. In the past decade, 
coaches’ salaries have exploded—even assistant coaches earn significantly 
more than any university employee other than senior administrators and 
head coaches.65 
Further complicating this issue of coach costs are the buyouts associated 
with firing coaches. The fan bases at many Power Five conference schools 
demand annual success in football and/or basketball. If a coach fails to 
achieve the expected level of short-term success, institutions and athletics 
directors face stiff pressures to find a new coach that can win at the desired 
level.66 As such, universities often terminate coaches prior to the completion 
of their contracts.67 Accordingly, many coaches negotiate buy-outs, often 
requiring the university to pay the full amount of the remaining balance on 
their contracts upon termination, and sometimes more.68 The university 
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thus must pay the terminated coach a multi-million dollar severance 
package while also finding funds necessary to pay the multi-million dollar 
annual salary of the replacement coach.69  
To recruit the best athletes, though, an institution needs more than just 
the best coaches. Institutions need outstanding facilities. In the past 
decade, the quality of university athletics facilities has improved 
significantly.70 To be fair, some of these improvements generate revenue 
to more than cover their expense—boxes in football stadiums being the 
obvious example. Even then, those additional revenues stay with the 
athletics department and typically do not end up in academic departments.  
The result of these expenditures has been an arms race of sorts. 
Universities continue to spend and create a new, higher standard for 
athletics facilities. Most large football programs, for instance, sport 
magnificent indoor practice facilities, state-of-the-art training equipment, 
and nutrition management programs.71 For athletics programs that benefit 
from having a conference television network, like those in the SEC or Big 
Ten, the funds exist to compete in this arms race. For smaller schools, 
though, the cost of keeping up has become increasingly difficult to the 
point that some universities have considered abandoning their football 
programs for economic reasons.72 Having first-rate facilities is essential to 
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recruiting top athletes, and in many cases, to being competitive on the 
field.  
It is one thing to have wealthy donors contribute to make the athletics 
facilities outstanding and to fund the largesse of coaches’ salaries. 
Increasingly, however, this burden falls on current students, particularly at 
institutions outside the Power Five Conferences.73 With college tuition 
significantly increasing annually, it seems troubling that part of that 
increase serves solely to fund athletics facilities and/or coaches’ salaries.74 
This concern is particularly true at universities where other facilities on 
campus need updating. Rather than provide adequate air conditioning in a 
campus building used for classes daily, for instance, a university might 
elect to provide additional amenities for the football locker room.75  
At some schools, the picture is a metaphorical house with a beautiful 
façade and front porch—the athletics facilities—masking a dilapidated 
structure in need of repair—the rest of the university. If one continues to 
invest in the façade instead of the foundation, the building might, at some 
point, collapse upon itself. 
If the NCAA and college presidents truly value education and if the 
student-athlete ideal has a legitimate academic component, these leaders 
must insist that the commercialization of college athletics does not 
compromise the identity of the university at large. For decades, the degree 
to which the education of intercollegiate athletes in revenue sports is 
dubious has remained a question that plagues athletics departments. 
Although many universities spend significant resources to make the 
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education of athletes legitimate and robust, a number of examples show 
that this ideal remains a farce.76  
The question becomes whether the university is compliant in the use 
of athletes for its own economic ends, denying them payment for services 
under the guise of “amateurism,” or whether the university instead 
provides a valuable education that garners lifelong benefits in exchange 
for athletics participation.  
The universities and the NCAA itself seem to give the game away, 
though, when the commercialization goes further than simply to ensure a 
robust academic experience for student-athletes and starts to undermine 
the academic goals of the university as a whole.77 If non-athlete students 
must subsidize coaches’ salaries and athletics facilities as part of their cost 
of education, the athletics program starts to become the central purpose of 
the institution’s existence—instead of the education of students. Perhaps 
viewing the student subsidy of athletics as such a significant step towards 
shifting the balance of power is premature; it is the same kind of slippery 
slope argument, however, that the NCAA continues to advance concerning 
compensating athletes in revenue sports. 
II. ENHANCING “EDUCATION” 
Given the shifting status quo and the growth of intercollegiate athletics 
in the past decade, university presidents need to think critically and 
collectively about how to use athletics to help the university and prevent 
the university from being subsumed into athletics. Part of this approach 
requires university presidents to exert greater control over the NCAA, and 
part of it requires presidents to exert greater control over athletics 
departments. Specifically, this Article argues for the following four-part 
approach: (1) address the arms race; (2) reduce or, in many cases, 
eliminate university subsidy of education; (3) mandate an athletics subsidy 
of education; and (4) reform the NCAA. 
A. Addressing the Arms Race 
The driver for the financial issues in many athletics departments 
remains the arms race between universities to provide better facilities for 
                                                                                                             
 76. See, e.g., Jake New, An ‘Epidemic’ of Academic Fraud, INSIDE HIGHER 
EDUC. (July 8, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/08/more-
dozen-athletic-programs-have-committed-academic-fraud-last-decade-more-likely 
(listing a number of examples of academic fraud involving student-athletes) 
[https://perma.cc/96NU-DS7A]. 
 77. Branch, supra note 18.  
214 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
their football and basketball teams and the lucrative contracts paid to the 
coaches of those teams. Presidents and their universities must find some 
way to halt, or at least slow down, this progression. Recently, the arms 
race between the Power Five conferences received an injection of capital 
from the adoption of the college football playoff and the development of 
conference television networks.78 
With respect to coaches’ salaries, restricting payouts collectively 
would be difficult because of antitrust law. Despite the desire of college 
presidents to do so, adoption of a coach “salary cap” or other limit upon 
coaches’ salaries would violate the Sherman Act. Indeed, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit struck down such a measure in Law 
v. NCAA, finding that the NCAA’s limit on salary for restricted earnings 
for basketball coaches violated antitrust law.79 
One possible, albeit unlikely, way that administrators could restrict the 
salaries of college coaches unilaterally is by convincing the coaches to 
unionize. Given the value of the free market in driving up salaries, the 
incentive for coaches to unionize seems non-existent. Were a union-
management relationship in place, however, such a salary cap could be part 
of a collective bargaining agreement, making it exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny.80 
The perception that college coaches add significant value to the outcome 
and success of teams continues to drive the market. In addition, the perception 
among fans that each win is significant—that is, treating an 8-4 record as 
vastly preferable to a 7-5 record—also creates the appearance that the right 
coach is worth the university paying millions of dollars in coaches’ salaries. 
Likewise, any limits on the universities’ ability to upgrade their facilities 
seem difficult to impose and impossible to enforce. Antitrust law, again, likely 
would limit the ability of the NCAA or the conferences to place significant 
restrictions on the commercial activity of universities, particularly public 
ones. 
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The way, then, to slow the arms race between universities is to reduce 
the amount of capital available to pay coaches and upgrade facilities. The 
NCAA and/or the conferences could play a vital role in this context. The 
volume of revenue that flows out of television telecasts and postseason 
competitions remains significant. In fact, the NCAA’s organizational 
income comes largely from the NCAA basketball tournament held each 
March, which reportedly generates over $1 billion.81 
The NCAA determines how payouts of this revenue occur to the 
conferences. By diverting some of that revenue to academic departments 
and/or placing conditions on receipt of that revenue, the NCAA could help 
shift the culture away from financial profit for athletics departments and 
toward subsidization of the university at large. The NCAA already 
regulates postseason eligibility based on academic performance with its 
Academic Progress Rate (“APR”) system.82 Taking the additional step of 
diverting funds to academic units, or requiring presidents to do so, could 
help curb the arms race and reduce the growth of athletics building projects 
in lieu of academic expenditures.83 
Similarly, conferences could elect to divert profits from revenue sports 
into universities as a whole. To demonstrate their seriousness about the 
academic pursuits of their universities, college presidents could allocate 
funds through the entity of the conference toward academic endeavors. 
The Southeastern Conference (“SEC”) has taken baby steps in this 
direction through its SEC-U program, as has the Big Ten through its 
annual academic consortium.84 On the whole, though, these programs 
seem more like lip service paid to the value of education rather than 
significant economic contributions to improve academic facilities, faculty 
salaries, and research programs. 
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B. Eliminating University Subsidy of Athletics 
At minimum, colleges and universities should reduce and, where 
possible, eliminate subsidy of athletics by current students. Student tuition 
and fees should not support athletics; the funds primarily should support 
the academic programs of the institution.  
The reality of the arms race, however, means that university leaders 
often feel as if they have no alternative. Football, in particular, requires 
significant expenditures not only for coaches’ salaries and facilities but 
also for recruiting expenditures.85 For non-Power Five conference schools, 
this expectation becomes increasingly difficult to meet, especially when 
the college or university location is in an area that is less likely to produce 
star athletes. 
One option, in theory, is to abandon the football program altogether. 
The recent experience at the University of Alabama-Birmingham (“UAB”), 
however, counsels against such a move unless as a last resort.86 UAB 
announced that funding issues were causing the university to abandon its 
football program.87 The alumni responded by pressuring the university into 
reversing its decision with the promise of significant fundraising.88 
In many cases, one cannot overstate the passion that university alumni 
hold for the football program. A quick comparison between university 
fundraising generally and athletics fundraising in particular bears this 
out.89 Although it may be important to the university to keep such 
programs alive, placing the economic burden on the students undermines 
the concept of amateurism and the purported educational focus of the 
student-athlete model. 
When universities allow student tuition and/or fees to subsidize the 
football program, the institutions prioritize athletics over academics both 
symbolically and practically. The purpose of the universities is not to 
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and now Blazers are back, USA TODAY (June 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday 
.com/story/sports/ncaaf/cusa/2017/06/28/football-returns-uab-blazers/437009001/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZVM-UKNW]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Brad Wolverton & Sandhya Kambhampati, Colleges Raised 1.2 
Billion for in Donations for Sports in 2015, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 
27, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Raised-12-Billion/235058 
(showing that alumni contribute significantly to athletics, not just the university 
itself) [https://perma.cc/73WR-Z3FP]. 
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support athletics; rather, the athletics program exists to benefit the 
university. 
C. Mandating Athletics Subsidy of Education 
University chancellors and presidents should not stop at banning the 
use of student tuition and fees to subsidize athletics. Instead, they should 
mandate that athletics help, at least in a small way, to subsidize education 
of the student-athletes at a minimum, and benefit the academic programs 
at the university as well. This is particularly true at Power Five schools 
that currently reap tens of millions of dollars annually from college sports. 
These subsidies should require the expenditure of monies beyond what 
athletics pays to cover the tuition of athletes. 
Some universities have done this in the past; the University of 
Georgia, the University of Florida, and Louisiana State University are 
examples of institutions where such subsidies have taken place.90 
Conferences also increasingly sponsor programs that support research or 
other educational ventures.91 
Nonetheless, athletics revenue can play an increasingly valuable role in 
the university, particularly if universities start to curb the arms race for 
coaches’ salaries and athletics facilities. State universities, for instance, face 
increasing economic challenges as states continue to reduce higher 
education subsidies.92 Athletics revenue from lucrative television contracts 
could provide a partial hedge against state budget cuts in higher education. 
As explored below, challenges exist to such an approach—the incentive 
remains for athletics programs to win at all costs. Collective action between 
universities likewise is not an option given antitrust restrictions. Institutional 
                                                                                                             
 90. See, e.g., Leighton Rowell, Football Revenue Bolsters Academics, RED & 
BLACK (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.redandblack.com/uganews/football-revenue-
bolsters-athletics-academics/article_706019cc-01dd-11e6-8b16-0ba043051140. html 
[https://perma.cc/B5YX-Z938]; Scott Rabalais, LSU Athletic Department Transfers 
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ADVOCATE (July 30, 2015), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports 
/lsu/article_edfb8b30-060d-5d93-949c-6878e5ec3d44.html [https://per ma.cc/LS6R-
58XF]; Ben Mangrum, Is College Football Profitable for Universities?, ETHOS (Mar. 
27, 2014), http://www.ethosreview.org/intellectual-spaces/is-college-football-profit 
able/ [https://perma.cc/XZC7-VUVE]. 
 91. See Wolken, supra note 86. 
 92. See PHIL OLIFF ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, RECENT 
DEEP STATE HIGHER EDUCATION CUTS MAY HARM STUDENT AND THE ECONOMY 
FOR YEARS TO COME 1 (Mar. 19, 2013).  
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change, however, at the conference and NCAA levels may offer a panacea 
to such difficulties. 
D. Reforming the NCAA 
The current focus of NCAA resources, at least with respect to its 
Committee on Infractions (“COI”), is the preservation of amateurism.93 
Ensuring that student-athletes do not receive any impermissible financial 
benefits remains the priority.94 Given the overwhelming commercialization of 
intercollegiate revenue sports, such efforts seem silly at best and completely 
myopic at worst. 
A return to the rationale behind the concept of amateurism, as construed 
by the NCAA, is instructive here.95 According to the NCAA, the primary 
reason that student-athletes should not receive remuneration for participation 
in intercollegiate athletics relates to the larger purpose of education. As 
noted above, the NCAA Manual provides: 
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
their participation should be motivated primarily by education 
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. 
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, 
and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.96 
Significantly, the NCAA is not an external governing power that 
imposes its own preferences and ideologies upon higher educational 
institutions. Rather, college and university presidents participate as voting 
members to shape the NCAA’s rules, policies, and actions.97 To the degree 
that the NCAA acts incongruent with the wishes of university leaders, 
universities easily can leave the NCAA and form their own structure based 
on the strong conference affiliations that currently exist. Indeed, in recent 
years several conference commissioners have threatened as much.98 The 
                                                                                                             
 93. See, e.g., Amateurism, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www 
.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Aug. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/D8FW-J6F4]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See generally William W. Berry III, Amending Amateurism, 68 ALA. L. 
REV. 551 (2016) (describing this rationale) 
 96. NCAA 2016-2017 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 26, art. 2.9 (2017) 
(emphasis added). 
 97. See generally id. 
 98. See, e.g., Brian Porto et al., The ‘Big Five’ Power Grab: the Real Threat to 
College Sports, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (June 19, 2014), http://www 
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NCAA then can provide a tool by which presidents rebalance the 
relationship between athletics and the university.  
III. MAPPING THE FUTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY-ATHLETICS 
RELATIONSHIP 
In light of the complexity of the issues raised above, this Article 
concludes by offering an initial sketch of possible reforms. To frame the 
discussion, the first section below describes some of the obstacles to 
reform. 
A. Obstacles to Reform 
The resistance to reform in intercollegiate athletics consists of four 
obstacles: (1) the inertia of the status quo; (2) the unfamiliarity of college 
presidents with athletics; (3) the popularity and visibility of the broader 
endeavor; and (4) the academic disinclination of some students. Each is 
discussed in turn. 
1. Status Quo Inertia 
For many stakeholders, the current dominance of athletics could not 
be more ideal. At the universities in the Big Five conferences, the athletics 
departments have unprecedented funds to improve facilities and compete 
for coaches.99 The increased budgets and opportunities make changes 
unlikely, especially as the arms race among big-time programs continues. 
The universities themselves, at least the athletics departments, enjoy 
significant windfall in terms of revenue from competitions and 
television.100  
Likewise, for many of the external stakeholders, the current status quo 
remains lucrative. Sponsors, in particular, can saturate fans with their 
advertising and marketing.101 The television networks thrive as well, for 
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 99. See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz & Christopher Schnaars, Colleges Are Spending 
More on their Athletes Because They Can, USA TODAY (July 6, 2017), https://www 
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 100. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., Sponsorship Spending on College Athletics Totals $1.1 Billion in 
2014/15 Season, SPONSORSHIP (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.sponsorship.com/iegsr 
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the time being, as a result of the status quo. Indeed, the demand for live 
broadcasts of sports competitions remains one of the two shrinking 
bulwarks protecting the television network, news being the other.102 
Football games have expanded beyond the Saturday schedule to include 
games on almost every night of the week excluding Sunday and Monday, 
which remain the domain of the National Football League (“NFL”).  
The coaches likewise enjoy significant benefits from the current 
largesse. Athletics directors also have the benefits of both larger budgets 
and the ability to engage in large construction and renovation projects, 
including building stadiums and upgrading facilities. 
The fans also enjoy the current status quo because of an increased 
focus on the “fan experience” at the games. This includes increased access 
to the athletics programs, both through television and personal experience. 
The pomp and circumstance surrounding games has never been higher, 
and the level of interest has made otherwise meaningless games take on a 
deep personal significance for fans. 
Given the stakeholders currently profiting, the power of the status quo 
remains a significant barrier to change. Any revised model will need to 
consider how to maintain the benefit for these stakeholders or else face 
significant resistance. 
2. Unfamiliarity of Presidents with Athletics 
A second barrier to change lies in the unfamiliarity of many college 
and university presidents with the nuances of intercollegiate athletics, both 
structurally and as a business model. Many presidents reach their positions 
by serving as professors first, then as deans and senior administrators.103 
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 102. Streaming content threatens the future of sports on network television. 
See Ira Boudway & Max Chafkin, ESPN Has Seen the Future of TV and They’re 
Not Really Into It, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com 
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 103. See, e.g., President Stuart R. Bell, UNIV. OF ALA., https://president.ua 
.edu/biography (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing Dr. Bell’s previous 
positions as Executive Vice President and Provost at Louisiana State University 
before becoming President at the University of Alabama) [https://perma.cc/KF46-
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dent/about/ president-eli-capilouto (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing Dr. 
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As such, the intercollegiate athletics model and the inner workings of the 
student-athlete model may be unfamiliar to presidents. Many presidents 
choose to keep the status quo unless the status quo creates a negative 
consequence for the larger university. 
Even in such situations, presidents and senior administrators may turn a 
blind eye to issues in the athletics department. The Pennsylvania State scandal 
provides the most obvious example of a president’s ignorance of an athletics 
department’s issues, but similar improprieties have occurred in other 
universities as well.104 Likewise, the number of academic scandals at 
otherwise reputable institutions suggests that universities need to properly 
oversee the academic progress of their athletes.105 Presidents have a 
responsibility to become engaged with their athletics programs, not just to 
keep the university out of trouble but, as argued here, to find ways to use 
athletics to benefit the university as a whole.106 
3. Popularity and Visibility of Athletics 
A similar impediment to changing the status quo rests in the 
widespread popularity and visibility of athletics. Even small changes 
become fodder for call-in radio shows, and the growth of sports media and 
television channels makes overblown coverage of changes not just 
possible, but likely. 
Given the popularity of college sports, there exists a strong sentiment 
in preserving the status quo. Many fans oppose compensation of college 
athletes based on the principle of amateurism, despite the admission of 
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[https://perma.cc/LQM7-PVZ3]; see also Ravi Lulla, The 10 Worst Scandals in 
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many fans that violating that principle would not diminish their interest in 
the competitions themselves.107 
The level of interest and engagement likewise leads, in some cases, to 
a sense of fan entitlement such that fans believe they know more about the 
sport than those actually managing and participating in it. This level of 
interest creates a possibility, or at least a fear of the possibility, of a 
decrease in interest resulting from a significant change to the status quo. 
This concern likewise contributes to the inertia inherent in the status quo. 
4. Academic Gaps for Some Athletes 
A final barrier to altering the status quo is the disinclination of some 
athletes toward education. Despite the reality that only a small percentage 
of athletes make professional teams, the focus of some athletes in 
attending a university purely is to participate in intercollegiate athletics. 108 
The academic requirements serve only as a prerequisite to eligibility, and 
at some institutions, the level of academic rigor is minimal for the athletes.109 
Along with academic disinterestedness, a second problem is the lack of 
college preparedness of some athletes. Requiring athletes who are not college-
prepared to perform in the academic curriculum while participating in the full-
time job of being a member of an intercollegiate sports team creates a need to 
give academics short shrift in some situations.110 
One proposal is to minimize the academic requirements for student-athletes 
during the season, such that they are essentially half-time students for four 
years.111 The student-athletes then could devote complete attention to 
academics for two years after using their eligibility and failing to make a 
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professional team. Opponents of this view argue that such athletes would 
not choose to complete their education. 
The movement toward a more serious application of the student-
athlete paradigm, then, also must overcome this pressure to maintain the 
status quo and perhaps even minimize the academic requirements 
themselves. 
B. A Roadmap for Readjustment 
This Article concludes by introducing preliminary ideas for how 
presidents might readjust the relationship between the university and the 
athletics department to promote an institutional symbiosis by strengthening 
education. 
1. Restructure the NCAA: Emphasize Education, not Amateurism 
The NCAA’s focus is to prevent paying athletes, down to restricting 
infinitesimal benefits, such as car rides and other de minimis forms of aid. 
The NCAA’s pursuit of large capital contributions to athletes, such as the 
case of Reggie Bush, is understandable, but trying to police every small 
benefit seems both to be unnecessary and a poor use of resources.112 
This notion is particularly true when the education available to athletes 
becomes compromised in many situations. From egregious examples like 
the University of North Carolina to the more benign issue of major 
clustering, the NCAA’s focus should be to ensure that the academic 
product provided to athletes is both legitimate and robust. 
This transposition involves several shifts in focus and policy, but the 
changes all make sense in light of the NCAA’s stated mission. First, the 
NCAA should police the time that teams spend on athletics in a more 
robust way, drawing sharper limits on practice time and, in particular, off-
season time. For the student-athlete model to be realistic, athletics cannot 
be a full-time job for the athletes.113 The NCAA similarly should punish 
academic malfeasance more seriously than it punishes the providing of 
economic benefits to athletes.  
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The guiding value should be “student”—not “amateur.” The former 
rests at the core of the institutional purpose; the latter lacks significant 
justification in many ways. If the NCAA is serious in promoting the 
“professional prospects” of its athletes in areas other than sports, it should 
make every effort to create campus balance between academics and 
athletics. This academic focus should extend far beyond the barometer of 
graduation and assess the quality of education provided to athletes. 
Ironically, the experiences of the Committee on Infractions members 
typically will align much better with an educational focus anyway, as 
many of the members are faculty and administrators. A restructuring of 
the COI and the NCAA more generally to align with this concern will 
legitimize the rhetoric of the NCAA concerning student-athletes. Certainly 
such an approach would be more in line with Myles Brand’s vision for the 
NCAA.114 
2. Grow Athletics, but Leverage Economic Gains Through 
Conferences 
Universities should continue to grow athletics and the economic 
largesse that accompanies such growth, but use the conferences to reallocate 
these gains to academics. On the one hand, if the result of continued growth 
remains limited to increases in coaches’ salaries and improved facilities, the 
benefits to the university as a whole will be tangential only. On the other 
hand, if conferences could siphon off a percentage of earnings and allocate 
these funds to the academic departments of the universities, athletics and 
academics would operate in a more symbiotic manner. 
Leaving the allocation up to the current presidents has the practical 
consequence of limiting athletics department support of academics, 
particularly outside of the Power Five conferences. If, however, conference 
commissioners allocated money to academics and policed those allocations, 
then they could help restore the balance between academics and athletics. 
3. Reduce Coach Firings and Buyouts 
Another major economic drain in the athletics department results from 
coach firings and buyouts. When there is a multi-million dollar cost to firing 
a coach, the athletics department typically wastes resources in the name of a 
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few wins. Administrators should fight market pressures to grant such buyouts 
and, alternatively, choose not to fire coaches prematurely. The value of a win 
or two does not alter the economic balance in a significant way for most 
athletics departments.115 In addition, with conference revenue sharing, the 
universities receive a degree of insulation from the roller coaster of good and 
bad seasons.  
Indeed, the amount of revenue loss based on a poor season or two does 
not justify the cost of the buyouts in many cases.116 With college presidents 
exercising a greater degree of financial oversight of athletics, the willingness 
to enter into such contracts and fire coaches prematurely might diminish. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, this Article challenges college presidents to engage with the 
current intercollegiate athletics status quo in a more aggressive way to restore 
the balance between sports and academics. Specifically, the Article argues for 
the leveraging of economic growth in athletics to benefit the academic side of 
the university.  
In doing so, the Article describes the shift from a symbiotic relationship 
to a more parasitic relationship, with athletics exerting dominance over the 
university at many institutions. It further argues for a rebalancing—outlining 
a relational shift consistent with the values of the NCAA and the practices at 
some institutions. Finally, the Article concludes by addressing the practical 
obstacles to such a shift and providing a road map for universities to enhance 
the student-athlete educational model championed by the NCAA. 
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